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Voters punish members of Congress who misbehave: only
two-thirds of representatives and barely two-fifths of senators
survive scandals.
Scandals have become a recurring feature of modern political life, but do they inevitably spell
electoral doom for senators and representatives? Looking at data from 171 scandals from
1990 to 2010, Scott Basinger finds that scandal-tainted members of Congress are more
than twice as likely to be defeated in general elections as the scandal-free. Scandals also
mean much narrower election victories for incumbents when they do win elections. Overall,
only two-thirds of representatives and barely two-fifths of senators survive their scandals
because of election losses, retirement or resignation. 
Polit ical scandals provide an ideal setting f or examining whether elections address a basic problem of
representative democracy: ensuring that self - interested elected of f icials pursue the public interest. The
principal mechanism f or ensuring representation is the reelection incentive, but public ignorance potentially
undermines accountability. Scholars have devoted great ef f ort to a complex problem of  discerning whether
voters punish representatives f or voting divergently f rom their district’s interests. I recently looked at the
relatively simpler problem of  assessing the electorate’s response to scandals involving members of
Congress.
Bef ore scandals’ electoral impact can be assessed, one must know how of ten scandals occur. In a research
project sponsored by the Dirksen Congressional Center, I assembled lists of  scandals involving the
members of  the U.S. House of  Representatives and U.S. Senate. Between 1990 and 2010, representatives
were involved in 142 scandals, and senators were involved in 31 scandals. Combined, this amounts to
nearly 9 scandals per year and 17 per election cycle. In some election cycles, dozens of  members may be
involved in a single scandal, as occurred in 1991-2 (the House Bank) and 2005-6 (Abramof f ). Figure 1
shows the f requency of  scandals per election, combining representatives and senators.
Figure 1 – Scandals per election cycle, 1992-2010
Scandal, as I use the term, covers a wide range of  alleged misdeeds. Corruption and f inancial misf easance
account f or more than half  of  the scandals in my database. Although sex scandals of ten cause media
f renzies, they account f or just under one-f if th of  scandals. Misuses of  polit ical power, a category that
includes campaign f inance improprieties, misuse of  congressional of f ices, and vote f raud, also account f or
just under one-f if th of  scandals. A residual category that includes driving under the inf luence of  drugs or
alcohol, assault, trespassing, and so f orth, accounts f or one-tenth of  scandals.
To assess the magnitude of  scandals’ electoral impact, I looked at how the incumbent’s margin of  victory
changes f rom the election bef ore a scandal to the election af ter the scandal. For example, in 2002, Steve
La Tourette, Republican f rom Ohio’s newly drawn 14th district, def eated his Democratic challenger 72
percent to 24 percent, yielding a margin of  victory of  48. In 2003, it was revealed that La Tourette’s was
estranged f rom his wif e, the result of  an extramarital af f air with his chief -of -staf f . Lest one think that this
is a private matter between spouses, the f ormer Mrs. La Tourette spoke openly to the newspaper and took
the extraordinary step of  placing campaign signs f or the Democratic candidate in her f ront yard. In the 2004
election, La Tourette won re-election, but claimed only 63 percent of  the vote against 37 percent f or the
Democrat, yielding a margin of  victory of  26. The change in La Tourette’s margin of  victory was -22.
For brevity, let me call this quantity delta. For House incumbents who were involved in a scandal, their
average delta is -4.3 (with a standard deviation of  19.2). By contrast, House incumbents who were not
involved in a scandal have an average delta of  +1.7 (with a standard deviation of  15.7). To summarize,
scandal- tainted House incumbents’ margins of  victory are, on average, 6 points less than they would have
been had they avoided scandal.
Figure 2 provides two histograms, showing the distributions of  deltas f or both scandal- tainted incumbents
(Figure 2) and scandal- f ree incumbents (Figure 3). The number of  scandal- tainted House incumbents f or
whom we could compute delta is relatively small, due to retirements, resignations, uncontested elections
bef ore the scandal broke, etc., so the distribution appears less smooth than that of  scandal- f ree
incumbents.
Figure 2 – Change in victory margin for scandal-tainted incumbent representatives, 1992-2010
Figure 3 – Change in victory margin for scandal-free incumbent representatives, 1992-2010
Alternative methods of  analysis conf irm that scandals have electoral impact. The median delta is -4.4 f or
scandal- tainted incumbents versus +1.0 f or scandal- f ree incumbents. Additionally, 63 percent of  scandal-
tainted incumbents had a negative delta, compared to 46 percent of  scandal- f ree incumbents.
Turning our attention to senators, the sample size is f ar smaller, but the apparent electoral ef f ects are
even larger. For scandal- tainted incumbent senators, their average delta is -8.6 (with a standard deviation
of  9.1), while scandal- f ree incumbent senators’ average delta is +1.9 (with a standard deviation of  10.3). On
average, scandal- tainted Senate incumbents’ margins of  victory are 10.5 points less than they would have
been had they avoided scandal.
Scandals’ ef f ects on electoral margins translate directly into general election outcomes. Table 1 shows the
average vote margin (vote share f or the incumbent minus vote share f or the challenger) and the proportion
of  general election def eats f or House and Senate incumbents. In general, scandal- tainted members of
Congress are more than twice as likely to be def eated in general elections as scandal- f ree members of
Congress (although senators begin in a more precarious situation).
Table 1 – Scandals and general election outcomes, House and Senate, 1992-2010
Table 1 also shows that scandal- tainted incumbents are more likely to exit Congress bef ore the general
election. Overall, when voluntary exits, primary election def eats, and general election def eats are combined,
just 67 percent of  scandal- tainted representatives and 42 percent of  scandal- tainted senators survived
their scandal through one election cycle. Scandal- f ree representatives and senators sought and won re-
election 88 percent and 70 percent of  the time, respectively. Put another way, 33 percent of  scandal- tainted
representatives and 58 percent of  scandal- tainted senators do not win another election to their chamber
af ter a scandal breaks.
On the surf ace, it would seem that we owe the voters credit f or ejecting members of  Congress who have
been involved in scandals. However, conventional wisdom among congressional elections scholars holds
that the candidates who bravely challenge incumbents deserve some share of  the credit, particularly when
these challengers are “experienced” – i.e., occupants of  state and local elective of f ices. This view, which
could be called the strategic entry thesis, receives no support in my analysis. Figure 4 shows that scandal-
f ree and scandal- tainted incumbents in the House are equally likely to f ace experienced challengers
(roughly 16 percent). Although senators are f ar more likely to f ace experienced challengers (roughly 40
percent), the likelihood hardly dif f ers between the scandal- f ree and scandal- tainted. Instead, the main
dif f erence between scandal- f ree and scandal- tainted incumbents in each chamber is that scandals greatly
increase the likelihood that the incumbent exits (i.e., retires, resigns, or loses the primary) prior to the
general election.
Figure 4 – Scandals and general election contexts for incumbents in House and Senate
Note: Bar height indicates percent of incumbents in each category.
Source: Reprinted from “The Electoral Effects of Congressional Scandals  
Figure 5 examines the f requency at which incumbents (or the candidate belonging to the incumbents’ party,
in the case of  open seats) won the election depending on the general election context. By examining
adjacent blue columns (representatives) or adjacent red columns (senators), one observes that scandal-
tainted incumbents lost more of ten than scandal- f ree incumbents, particularly when they f aced experienced
challengers.
Figure 5 – Election victories and scandals in the House and Senate
Note: Bar height indicates percent of incumbent-party candidates winning election.
Source: Reprinted from “The Electoral Effects of Congressional Scandals  
The implication of  this research is that members of  Congress who misbehave can expect retribution at the
polls, assuming they make it that f ar. Comparing general election loss rates to pre-general election exit
rates, one can observe that members are more than twice as likely to exit, whether voluntarily (through
retirement and resignation) or involuntarily (through primary election def eat), as to lose. And, although the
data on scandals’ f requency indicate that misconduct is becoming more prevalent or receiving more
publicity, the revelation that only two-thirds of  representatives and barely two-f if ths of  senators survived
their scandals suggests that ethics matters to voters.
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